The November 3, 2026 election was a devastating defeat for Texas Republicans. Democrats swept statewide offices, and Harris County Republicans once again found themselves on the losing end of countywide elections.
Texas finally went blue.
For those of us who have been involved in Republican politics for decades, that phrase has a familiar ring. I heard predictions that Texas was about to turn blue throughout my time as a Republican precinct chair in Orange County from 2000 to 2010. The warnings continued through subsequent election cycles, accompanied by competing explanations of why Republican dominance in Texas was supposedly coming to an end. Twenty years later, the prediction came true.
But that raises an important question: If people have been predicting this outcome for more than two decades, how do we distinguish those who correctly identified the causes from those who simply kept making the same prediction until it happened?
And perhaps more importantly, how do we separate legitimate explanations of the defeat from snap reactions, political opportunism, and the inevitable chorus of “I told you this was going to happen”?
A prediction is not an explanation. The fact that an anticipated outcome eventually occurs does not establish that the reasoning behind the prediction was correct. Some warnings may have identified important structural changes that contributed to the 2026 results. Others may have been based on assumptions that the evidence simply does not support.
We cannot determine which is which by examining the outcome alone.
That distinction matters because the explanations we accept today will influence the decisions Republicans make tomorrow.
The Danger of Learning the Wrong Lesson
Consider what might happen in 2028.
Republicans should experience a substantial electoral recovery because the national political environment changes, presidential election turnout produces a different electorate, and Democrats encounter political difficulties of their own.
If that happens, whichever faction successfully influences Republican strategy over the next two years will almost certainly claim credit for the recovery. Its explanation for the 2026 defeat will be declared correct, and its preferred strategy will be credited with producing the improvement.
But an electoral recovery does not necessarily validate the decisions preceding it.
Republicans could recover despite those decisions rather than because of them. Worse, a strategy that appears successful because of favorable circumstances could be undermining the party’s longer-term competitiveness.
That is why accurately diagnosing the 2026 election matters now, rather than waiting to see what happens in 2028.
The Danger of Reacting Too Quickly
Following an electoral defeat, political organizations frequently face demands to abandon unpopular positions, embrace new issues, moderate their messaging, or adopt a more confrontational approach.
Already, the banners are going up. Different factions are rallying around their preferred issues, presenting their long-held positions as the obvious lesson of an election whose causes we have barely begun to examine.
Some of those arguments may ultimately prove correct. Others may amount to little more than preexisting agendas in search of supporting evidence.
We should not confuse the intensity of someone’s convictions with evidence that those convictions explain the election results. Nor should we mistake someone’s platform, long history of political involvement, or repeated warnings for proof that their thesis is correct.
Some changes may be justified. Others may prove disastrous.
Republicans have traditionally described ourselves as the party of the big tent, a coalition of people who share certain fundamental principles but do not necessarily agree on every issue. Lately, however, ideological purity testing has placed enormous strain on that concept. Too often, disagreement over a particular issue becomes grounds for questioning whether someone belongs in the Republican Party at all.
The Republican coalition has long contained two broad philosophical traditions: a socially conservative wing emphasizing traditional values and a fiscally conservative or libertarian wing emphasizing limited government, individual liberty, and economic freedom. These are not mutually exclusive groups, and many Republicans identify with both. Nevertheless, there are important issues on which their priorities and underlying philosophies can conflict.
Those disagreements are not necessarily a weakness. A broad coalition should accommodate differing perspectives. The danger arises when either faction decides that its particular priorities must become the exclusive measure of Republican loyalty.
A big tent cannot survive if its occupants spend more time trying to throw one another out than finding reasons to remain together.
If the social-conservative and fiscal/libertarian wings cannot coexist, the challenge becomes much greater than simply attracting new voters. The party risks weakening the coalition it already has, making any durable political recovery considerably more difficult.
These divisions also create a significant danger when political leaders respond to an election by focusing on a particular issue without understanding the underlying polling. The divisions within the Republican electorate can be quite different from those between Republicans and Democrats.
A position that appears attractive to independent voters might alienate a substantial number of dependable Republican voters. Conversely, a position popular with the most politically active Republicans might make it difficult to attract voters necessary to win a general election.
The relevant question is not simply whether a proposed change appeals to people outside the party. It is whether that change will produce a net increase in Republican support after accounting for voters who might become less likely to support Republican candidates.
Loyal Republican voters cannot be treated as expendable in the pursuit of hypothetical new supporters. Locally, we need to retain and engage our existing voters, reconnect with Republicans who have become disillusioned, and reach moderates who might be willing to support Republican candidates, even if only in down-ballot races.
These are not mutually exclusive objectives, nor should we assume that what appeals to one group necessarily appeals to the others.
This is why the series will examine public opinion polling alongside election results where the evidence permits. Before drawing conclusions about what voters want, we should understand where Republicans agree, where they disagree, and how those views compare with the broader electorate.
The objective should be to identify opportunities for building a larger coalition without unnecessarily fracturing the coalition that already exists.
What the Numbers Can Tell Us
Over the coming articles, I intend to examine the 2026 election from several perspectives.
First, we will establish a numerical baseline. How many votes did Harris County Republican candidates receive in 2018, 2022, 2024, and 2026? How did Republican vote totals and vote shares change? What happened to Democratic totals, overall participation, and the relationship between turnout and registered voters?
Percentages alone can obscure important developments. A party can maintain its percentage of the vote while losing ground in absolute numbers, or increase its raw vote total while becoming less competitive in a growing electorate.
Second, we will examine competing explanations for the Republican defeat. These include turnout, candidate-specific effects, demographic changes, party organization, political messaging, and broader national conditions. We will consider what evidence supports each explanation and what evidence might contradict it.
Third, we will examine geographical voting patterns, with particular attention to areas where Republican voting behavior may reflect opposition to Donald Trump. The question is not simply where Republicans performed poorly, but whether there are identifiable patterns consistent with Republican-leaning voters withholding support, crossing party lines, or behaving differently from the traditional Republican electorate.
Geographic correlations alone cannot establish individual motivations, but they can help identify questions worth investigating.
Finally, we will compare Harris County Republican performance with Republican performance across Texas. This distinction is especially important. If Harris County follows substantially the same trajectory as the rest of the state, we should be cautious about attributing its performance entirely to local decisions. Conversely, if Harris County meaningfully underperforms comparable statewide trends, that deserves examination.
Finding Answers Rather Than Assigning Blame
None of this is intended to suggest that every explanation deserves equal weight or that criticism should be avoided.
Leadership decisions matter. Candidate quality matters. Organization, messaging, and the willingness to engage voters who disagree with us matter.
But identifying a disappointing outcome is not the same as establishing what caused it.
We should be willing to distinguish between evidence and assumption, correlation and causation, and short-term political advantage and long-term party health.
The purpose of this series is not to vindicate a particular faction within the Republican Party. Nor is it to declare in advance that the solution is ideological moderation, greater ideological purity, better turnout operations, or a different leadership team.
It is to determine what the available evidence actually supports. Do I have my own opinions of why this blue wave occurred? Absolutely, but I will disclose them so you can take my personal bias into account when looking at the numbers. My views should be subjected to the same scrutiny as anyone else’s, and are being disclosed to allow for testing the thesis they represent.
Republicans have two years before the next general election. Strategies adopted now will shape candidate recruitment, voter outreach, public messaging, and the priorities of party organizations long before November 2028.
Getting the diagnosis wrong could leave Republicans vulnerable even if the next election produces better results.
Winning in 2028 would be welcome. Understanding why Republicans lost in 2026 – and why they might win again – is essential to making that recovery sustainable.
This is the first in a series of election postmortem articles examining the 2026 results. Everyone views an election through their own prism, myself included. What follows will reflect the prism through which I view these issues, the assumptions I bring to the analysis, and an examination of whether the numbers support or challenge those preexisting views.
I do not pretend to approach this without opinions, but I intend to let the evidence inform the conclusions rather than the other way around. Where the evidence supports my assumptions, I will say so. Where it contradicts them, that deserves equal attention.
The posting schedule may be somewhat irregular. I have four trials scheduled between November 16 and December 7, and the work necessary to be appropriately prepared for those trials must take priority. That will necessarily affect both how frequently I can publish additional articles and how promptly I can respond to comments.
I welcome your thoughts, including disagreements and perspectives I may not have considered. If you would prefer not to leave a public comment, you are welcome to contact me directly by email or call my office.
Email: [email protected]
Office: 346-812-3546
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